POSTS

A partly-cloudy IPsec VPN

Brad Ackerman

Audience

I’m assuming that readers have at least a basic knowledge of TCP/IP networking and some UNIX or UNIX-like systems, but not necessarily OpenBSD or FreeBSD. This post will therefore be light on details that aren’t OS specific and are likely to be encountered in normal use (e.g., how to use vi or another text editor.) For more information on these topics, read Absolute FreeBSD (3ed.) by Michael W. Lucas.

Overview

I’m redoing my DigitalOcean virtual machines (which they call droplets). My requirements are:

  • VPN
    • Road-warrior access, so I can use private network resources from anywhere.
    • A site-to-site VPN, extending my home network to my VPSes.
  • Hosting for public and private network services.
  • A proxy service to provide a public IP address to services hosted at home.

The last item is on the list because I don’t actually have a public IP address at home; my firewall’s external address is in the RFC 1918 space, and the entire apartment building shares a single public IPv4 address.1 (IPv6? Don’t I wish.) The end-state network will include one OpenBSD droplet providing firewall, router, and VPN services; and one FreeBSD droplet hosting multiple jailed services.

I’ll be providing access via these droplets to a NextCloud instance at home. A simple NAT on the DO router droplet isn’t going to work, because packets going from home to the internet would exit through the apartment building’s connection and not through the VPN. It’s possible that I could do work around this issue with packet tagging using the pf firewall, but HAProxy is simple to configure and unlikely to result in hard-to-debug problems. relayd is also an option, but doesn’t have the TLS parsing abilities of HAProxy, which I’ll be using later on.

Since this system includes jails running on a VPS, and they’ve got RFC 1918 addresses, I want them reachable from my home network. Once that’s done, I can access the private address space from anywhere through a VPN connection to the cloudy router.

The VPN itself will be of the IPsec variety. IPsec is the traditional enterprise VPN standard, and is even used for classified applications, but has a (somewhat-deserved) reputation for complexity, but recent versions of OpenBSD turn down the difficulty by quite a bit.

The end-state network should look like:

End-state configuration of the network.

End-state configuration of the network.

This VPN both separates internal network traffic from public traffic and uses encryption to prevent interception or tampering.

Once traffic has been encrypted, decrypting it without the key would, as Bruce Schneier once put it, require a computer built from something other than matter that occupies something other than space. Dyson spheres and a frakton of causality violation would possibly work, as would mathemagical technology that alters the local calendar such that P=NP.2 Black-bag jobs and/or suborning cloud provider employees doesn’t quite have that guarantee of impossibility, however. If you have serious security requirements, you’ll need to do better than a random blog entry.

Install OpenBSD

DigitalOcean still doesn’t officially support OpenBSD, so we’ll create a FreeBSD ufs droplet and fix it in post. These instructions will work. Some useful notes:

  1. The current OpenBSD version is, as of this writing, 6.4. The below procedure both downloads the miniroot and verifies it against the provided checksum. (It won’t be explicitly mentioned after this step, but pretty much everything in this post will need root privileges.)

    $ sudo su -
    # fetch https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.4/amd64/{miniroot64.fs,SHA256}
    # sha256 -c `grep miniroot SHA256 | cut -d= -f2` miniroot64.fs
    SHA256 (miniroot64.fs) = 649b2f412750dee2ef6f42bdd66fb5f015d095b4225fb775a4267aa01e3f80dd
  2. The DigitalOcean console is a bit wonky in OpenBSD for some reason; it will frequently interpret the return key as two newlines. Ctrl-J seems to work better.

  3. The partitioning in the linked instructions works fine, but I prefer to have separate log partitions at a minimum, e.g.:

#                size           offset  fstype [fsize bsize   cpg]
  a:          8197.2M          2104544  4.2BSD   2048 16384 12958 # /
  b:          1027.6M               64    swap                    # none
  c:         25600.0M                0  unused
  d:          1529.6M         18892416  4.2BSD   2048 16384 12958 # /tmp
  e:          2047.4M         22025088  4.2BSD   2048 16384 12958 # /var
  f:          2055.2M         26218080  4.2BSD   2048 16384 12958 # /var/log
  g:         10738.8M         30427104  4.2BSD   2048 16384 12958 # /home

Configure OpenBSD

After rebooting into the newly-installed system, sshd is enabled but the root user can’t log in. If you didn’t create another user and add them to wheel yet, log in on the console and temporarily change PermitRootLogin to yes in /etc/ssh/sshd_config, then rcctl reload sshd. ssh in, add your public key to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, and change PermitRootLogin to without-password; or change it back to no after adding the non-root (but en-wheeled) user. There will almost certainly be security patches to install; run syspatch and reboot.

Unlike other operating systems, the necessary IPsec functionality is part of OpenBSD’s base system; we’ll install HAProxy for later, though. (And also vim, but that’s optional.) We’ll also set up doas with a configuration equivalent to DigitalOcean’s default sudo—permit users in wheel to run commands as root without a password, because user accounts don’t need them (and disabling ssh password-based login completely negates the Rumpelstiltskin attack3).

pkg_add haproxy vim--no_x11
echo "permit nopass :wheel" > /etc/doas.conf

Keymat generation

(N.B.: The terminology used in this blog is from Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) No. 4009.4)

OpenBSD’s ikectl command includes basic X.509 certificate authority (CA) functionality. For this article, we’ll use it to create a CA that directly signs keys. In a production system, please do not use an online root CA to sign everything. Faraday cages, hardware security modules, two-person integrity, and/or a Marine with an M4 are, as always, optional.

The defaults are read from /etc/ssl/ikeca.cnf. You’ll want to change the top section (CERT_*) to avoid repeatedly typing in the values you actually want for country/city/etc. (They don’t actually matter, but see Maxim #37: There is no overkill; there is only only “open fire” and “I need to reload”.) You may also wish to extend the certificate validity time and change the message digest to sha512 (which is faster than sha256 on modern computers) by editing the CA_default section at the bottom.

We then create our CA. Its name is arbitrary; here I’ll just use ipsec.

# ikectl ca ipsec create
CA passphrase:
Retype CA passphrase:
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
...............................+++
................................................................................
................................................................................
......+++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [US]:
State or Province Name (full name) [Zendia]:
Locality Name (eg, city) [Arkham]:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Miskatonic University]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) [iked]:
Common Name (eg, fully qualified host name) [VPN CA]:
Email Address [certs@example.com]:
Signature ok
subject=/C=US/ST=Zendia/L=Arkham/O=Miskatonic University/OU=iked/CN=VPN CA/emailAddress=certs@example.com
Getting Private key
Using configuration from /etc/ssl/ipsec/ca-revoke-ssl.cnf
# ikectl ca ipsec install

Supplying a password is mandatory; creation will fail if you try to just press enter. The password is saved in the CA directory (/etc/ssl/name), so this would be a less-than-ideal place for reuse.

Next, create the keying material (keymat) itself. ikectl is preconfigured to do the right thing, including putting the system’s FQDN in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field.

# ikectl ca ipsec install
certificate for CA 'ipsec' installed into /etc/iked/ca/ca.crt
CRL for CA 'ipsec' installed to /etc/iked/crls/ca.crl
# ikectl ca ipsec certificate my.cloudy.host.fqdn create
[ ... just hit enter at the prompts ... ]
# ikectl ca ipsec certificate my.cloudy.host.fqdn install
writing RSA key
# ikectl ca ipsec certificate my.home.router.fqdn create
[ ... same thing ... ]
# ikectl ca ipsec certificate my.home.router.fqdn export
Export passphrase:
Retype export passphrase:
writing RSA key
exported files in /root/my.home.router.fqdn.tgz

If you’d like to verify that the certificates have been generated correctly (never a bad idea), check the output of:

openssl x509 -in /etc/ssl/ipsec/"hostname goes here".crt -noout -text

The ikectl ca command generates the public certificate and private key; the export subcommand creates a tarball in your current directory, to be copied to the client, containing:

FilenameDescription
ca/ca.crtThe CA’s certificate
certs/my.home.router.fqdn.crtThe client’s certificate
crls/ca.crlThe CA’s current certificate revocation list
export/ca.pfxThe CA’s certificate in PKCS #12 format
export/my.home.router.fqdn.pfxThe CA’s certificate and client’s keypair in PKCS #12 format
private/my.home.router.fqdn.keyThe client’s RSA private key
private/local.keyThe client’s RSA private key (same as above)
local.pubThe client’s RSA public key

The PKCS #12 files (whether or not they contain private keys) are encrypted using the passphrase provided during export; all other files are unencrypted.

The install subcommand copies the selected certificate to /etc/iked/certs/my.cloudy.host.fqdn.crt (public) and /etc/iked/private/local.key (private).

Finally, the ikectl ca command does not place the keymat where iked will look, so copy it to the right place in the right format.

openssl rsa -in /etc/iked/private/local.key -pubout > \
  /etc/iked/pubkeys/fqdn/my.cloudy.host.fqdn
openssl x509 -pubkey  -in /etc/ssl/ipsec/my.home.router.fqdn.crt \
  -noout > /etc/iked/pubkeys/fqdn/my.home.router.fqdn

Network interfaces

We’ll configure multiple interfaces for the VPN; enc0 defines the endpoint address of the VPN itself, and gre0 defines the tunnel we’ll run over it. (GRE is required because OSPF uses multicast IP addresses, which won’t directly run over the IPsec tunnel.)

Create /etc/hostname.enc0 and /etc/hostname.gre0:

InterfaceContents of /etc/hostname.if
enc0inet 172.16.128.1/32
gre0inet 172.16.129.1/32
dest 172.16.129.2
tunnel 172.16.128.1 172.16.128.2

Then bring them up. You’ll probably see an error message about the hostname.if files being insecure; they were world-readable, which the netstart script corrects.

sh /etc/netstart enc0 gre0

sysctls

Some of the necessary features we’ll need aren’t enabled by default. Create /etc/sysctl.conf, which will be read on boot:

net.inet.ip.forwarding=1
net.inet6.ip6.forwarding=1
net.inet.gre.allow=1
net.inet.ipcomp.enable=1

Then activate these changes:

for i in $(cat /etc/sysctl.conf)
do
    sysctl $i
done

VPN and routing configuration

The VPN will initially encrypt and route traffic within our private address space; we’ll add other services later. To make this work, we’ll need to configure and enable:

  • ospfd
  • iked
  • pf
  • HAProxy

iked handles keying for the VPN endpoints. The daemon configuration (in /etc/iked.conf) will look something like this:

myfqdn = "my.cloudy.router.fqdn"
mypublic = "192.0.2.3"

homefqdn = "my.home.router.fqdn"

ikev2 "cloudy" default ipcomp esp \
        from 172.16.128.1/32 to 172.16.128.2/32 \
        local $mypublic  \
        ikesa enc aes-256 prf hmac-sha2-512 auth hmac-sha2-512 group ecp384 \
        childsa enc aes-256-gcm prf hmac-sha2-512 group ecp384 \
        srcid $myfqdn dstid $homefqdn

The above configuration creates a policy allowing traffic between 172.16.128.1 (enc0 on the server) and 172.16.128.2 (lo1 on the client). The srcid and dstid parameters specify which of the from and to address blocks is local and which remote.

We use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) for the child (ESP) SA, but that’s not an option for the parent (IKE) SA. iked’s configuration doesn’t specify the Integrity Check Value (ICV) length that would follow aes-256-gcm in other implementations (e.g. aes-256-gcm16); this is because you should only use a 16-octet ICV.

At this point, you can fix the configuration file’s permissions and turn on the VPN (temporarily)

chmod 640 /etc/iked.conf
iked -vvd

iked will display some debug messages to the terminal, but there shouldn’t be any errors. Press Ctrl-C to exit.

ospfd propagates routing information between the two sites, and is configured with /etc/ospfd.conf:

router-id 172.16.128.1

area 0.0.0.0 {
        interface gre0
}

And yes, that’s going to need to have the proper permissions.

chmod 640 /etc/ospfd.conf

We’ll configure OpenBSD’s firewall to allow remote dial-in and ensure that unencrypted traffic is not permitted to traverse the private network. A basic PF configuration (/etc/pf.conf):

ext_if="vio0"
int_if="vio1"

rtr_svc_tcp="{ssh}"

match in all scrub (no-df max-mss 1440)
match out on $ext_if inet from ! ($ext_if) nat-to ($ext_if)
antispoof for $ext_if

set skip on {lo, enc, gre}

block drop in on $ext_if
pass out on $ext_if
pass out on $int_if

pass in on $ext_if inet6 proto icmp6

# Port build user does not need network
block return out log proto {tcp udp} user _pbuild

# Router services
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port $rtr_svc_tcp keep state
pass in on $ext_if inet proto icmp from any to ($ext_if)

# Proxied services
# pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port {http, https} keep state

# IPsec
pass in on $ext_if proto {ah, esp} to ($ext_if)
pass in on $ext_if proto udp to ($ext_if) port { isakmp, ipsec-nat-t }

This can be enhanced to add filtering on the IPsec tunnel; that will be left as an exercise to the reader. Finally, load the firewall configuration, enable the services and restart to make sure everything’s good.

pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf
rcctl enable iked
rcctl enable ospfd
rcctl enable pf
shutdown -r now

We’ll configure HAProxy after setting up routing on the local end.

Configure the home network (FreeBSD)

Pre-setup

At the time of writing, the current FRRouting version isn’t in the default (quarterly) package repository; so we’ll need to switch this machine to latest by s/quarterly/latest in the repository URL, which is configured in /etc/pkg/FreeBSD.conf. Once that’s been done, install the packages we’ll need.

pkg update
pkg upgrade
pkg install frr6 strongswan

The enc interface driver in FreeBSD is a module by default, and isn’t automatically loaded. So we’ll need to load it now, and set it to load on boot.

echo 'if_enc_load="YES"' >> /boot/loader.conf
kldload if_enc

Firewall

At a minimum, we want to set skip on enc (or set up actual rules) and prevent internal traffic from leaking out unencrypted. For a proper value of paranoia, set up useful rules for the VPN instead of skipping those interfaces, and use an updown script to remove the tunnel configuration from gre0 when no IPsec connection is present.

/etc/pf.conf will look something like:

# The network card names for the internal and external interfaces go here.
int_if="xl0"
ext_if="cm0"
private_space="172.16.0.0/16"
set limit { states 40000, frags 20000, src-nodes 20000 }

scrub on $int_if all fragment reassemble
scrub on $ext_if all fragment reassemble

nat on $ext_if inet from ! ($ext_if) to any -> ($ext_if)

antispoof for $int_if

block drop in
# Don't filter loopback or the VPN.
set skip on {lo, enc, gre}

pass out flags S/SA keep state allow-opts
pass in on $int_if from ($int_if:network) to any

# Ensure that our VPN traffic won't try to escape.
block out on $ext_if proto gre
block out on $ext_if from $private_space to $private_space

Enabling the firewall is different from OpenBSD, but when you want to change the configuration it’s the same pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf as root.

sysrc pf_enable=YES
service pf start

IPsec

OpenBSD’s iked isn’t supported on other OSes, so we’ll use strongSwan instead.

We write a configuration to /usr/local/etc/swanctl/conf.d/cloudy.conf using values derived from Algo. One important note: every component of a proposal should be specified, or strongSwan will pick something stupid and the rekey negotiation will fail even though the initial keying went just fine. So for AEAD you’ll need to specify the encryption, pseudorandom function (hash), and Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve group, for a total of three components; non-AEAD proposals will separate the authentication and encryption algorithms for a total of four components.

connections {

   cloud {
      local_addrs  = %any
      remote_addrs = my.cloudy.host.fqdn

      local {
         auth = pubkey
         certs = my.home.router.fqdn.crt
         id = my.home.router.fqdn.org
      }
      remote {
         auth = pubkey
         id = my.cloudy.host.fqdn
         cacerts = ca.crt
      }
      children {
         net-net {
            local_ts = 172.16.128.2/32
            remote_ts = 172.16.128.1/32
            esp_proposals = aes256gcm16-prfsha512-ecp384
            dpd_action = restart
            ipcomp = yes
            hw_offload = auto
            # When the connection is loaded, or when it is closed, a trap
            # will be installed to reconnect when there's traffic. The
            # OSPF announcements will ensure that the link stays up at
            # all times.
            start_action = trap
            close_action = trap
         }
      }
      version = 2
      fragmentation = yes
      dpd_delay = 30s
      proposals = aes256-sha2_512-prfsha512-ecp384
   }
}

Put the keymat from the export tarball into /usr/local/etc/swanctl as follows:

Copy this fileto this subdirectory
ca/ca.crtx509ca
certs/my.home.router.fqdn.crtx509
private/my.home.router.fqdn.keyprivate

Verify that the configuration has been correctly input by loading it.

# service strongswan onestart
Starting strongSwan 5.7.1 IPsec [starter]...
no netkey IPsec stack detected
no KLIPS IPsec stack detected
no known IPsec stack detected, ignoring!

# swanctl --load-all
loaded certificate from '/usr/local/etc/swanctl/x509/my.home.router.fqdn.crt'
loaded certificate from '/usr/local/etc/swanctl/x509ca/ca.crt'
loaded rsa key from '/usr/local/etc/swanctl/private/my.home.router.fqdn.key'
no authorities found, 0 unloaded
no pools found, 0 unloaded
loaded connection 'cloudy'
successfully loaded 1 connections, 0 unloaded
# swanctl --list-certs

List of X.509 End Entity Certificates

  subject:  "C=US, ST=Massachusetts, L=Innsmouth, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=my.home.router.fqdn, E=certs@example.com"
  issuer:   "C=US, ST=Zendia, L=Arkham, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=VPN CA, E=certs@example.com"
  validity:  not before Sep 30 21:15:13 2018, ok
             not after  Jun 26 21:15:13 2021, ok (expires in 950 days)
  serial:    02
  altNames:  my.home.router.fqdn
  flags:     clientAuth
  subjkeyId: xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
  pubkey:    RSA 2048 bits, has private key
  keyid:     xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
  subjkey:   xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx

List of X.509 CA Certificates

  subject:  "C=US, ST=Zendia, L=Arkham, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=VPN CA, E=certs@example.com"
  issuer:   "C=US, ST=Zendia, L=Arkham, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=VPN CA, E=certs@example.com"
  validity:  not before Sep 30 21:13:24 2018, ok
             not after  Sep 30 21:13:24 2019, ok (expires in 315 days)
  serial:    xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
  flags:     CA CRLSign self-signed
  pathlen:   1
  subjkeyId: xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
  pubkey:    RSA 2048 bits
  keyid:     xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
  subjkey:   xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
# swanctl --list-conns
cloud: IKEv2, no reauthentication, rekeying every 14400s, dpd delay 30s
  local:  %any
  remote: my.cloudy.host.fqdn
  local public key authentication:
    id: my.home.router.fqdn
    certs: C=US, ST=Zendia, L=Arkham, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=my.home.router.fqdn, E=certs@example.com
  remote public key authentication:
    id: my.cloudy.host.fqdn
    cacerts: C=US, ST=Zendia, L=Arkham, O=Miskatonic University, OU=iked, CN=VPN CA, E=certs@exaple.com
  net-net: TUNNEL, rekeying every 3600s, dpd action is restart
    local:  172.16.128.2/32
    remote: 172.16.128.1/32

Now you can enable strongSwan in /etc/rc.conf.

sysrc strongswan_enable=YES

The provided init script doesn’t load swanctl on startup, so we’ll need to include our own as /usr/local/etc/rc.d/strongswan_swanctl:

#!/bin/sh
# Load or unload swanctl configuration.

# PROVIDE: strongswan_swanctl
# REQUIRE: strongswan
# BEFORE: LOGIN

command="/usr/local/sbin/swanctl"
. /etc/rc.subr

name="strongswan_swanctl"
rcvar=${name}_enable
extra_commands="reload"

load_rc_config $name

start_cmd="swanctl_start"
stop_cmd=":"
reload_cmd="swanctl_start"
restart_cmd="swanctl_start"
status_cmd="swanctl_status"

swanctl_start() {
  # strongswan's rc.d script exits before it's actually started.
  [ -e /var/run/charon.vici ] || sleep 1
  ${command} --load-all
}

swanctl_status() {
  ${command} --list-conns
  ${command} --list-certs
}

run_rc_command "$1"

Enable it as per usual, and create the gre0 interface corresponding to the one we created on the other side.

sysrc cloned_interfaces+="gre0"
sysrc ifconfig_gre0="inet 172.16.129.2/24 172.16.129.1"
sysrc ifconfig_gre0+="tunnel 172.16.128.2 172.16.128.1"
service netif start gif0
chmod +x /usr/local/etc/rc.d/strongswan_swanctl
sysrc strongswan_swanctl_enable=YES
service strongswan_swanctl start

OSPF

We’ll use FRRouting to implement OSPF on the FreeBSD side. First, enable it:

sysrc frr_enable="YES"
sysrc frr_daemons="zebra ospfd"
sysrc frr_wait_for="default"
# As suggested by the FRRouting package
echo "kern.ipc.maxsockbuf=16777216" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
touch /usr/local/etc/frr/{zebra,ospfd}.conf
chown -R frr:frr /usr/local/etc/frr
service frr start

Executing vtysh will open a Cisco-like shell in enable (administrator) mode. Enter configuration mode with config t, then configure OSPF:

router ospf
 passive-interface xl0
 network 172.16.1.0/24 area 0.0.0.0
 network 172.16.129.0/30 area 0.0.0.0

Interfaces on networks that you’ll be distributing routes for, and don’t themselves have an OSPF router on the other end, should be declared with passive-interface. Save with a control-Z, then wr mem. After a few seconds, show ip ospf neighbor should show the remote droplet.

Proxy configuration

As a reminder from part 1, we’re going to use HAProxy to allow services on the Internet to access a NextCloud instance at home. The proxy should support both TLS on port 443 (normal traffic) and cleartext on port 80 (Let’s Encrypt certificate renewal).

There are two possible ways to do this:

  • Terminate the TLS session in the cloud. Slightly riskier in that the cloud servers have access to the cleartext, but I’m probably being paranoid. Consolidated logging on one server.
  • Terminate the TLS session on the NextCloud server. Keeps exposure of the cleartext as low as possible, but need to correlate logs of two systems.

We’ll use the first of these options. The HAProxy configuration below exhibits several useful features:

  • Insecure TLS versions are dropped.
  • Connections are only passed through to the server if the client provides the correct hostname.

Put it in /etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg and modify as necessary.

global
        log /log   local0 info
        maxconn 1024
        chroot /var/haproxy
        uid 604
        gid 604
        daemon
        pidfile /var/run/haproxy.pid

defaults
        log     global
        mode    http
        option  httplog
        option  redispatch
        retries 3
        maxconn 2000
        timeout connect 5000ms
        timeout client 50000ms
        timeout server 50000ms

listen http-in
      mode http
      log global
      option httplog
      bind *:80
      http-request deny unless { hdr(Host) -m str nextcloud.fqdn.goes.here }
      use_backend http-ok

listen https-in
        mode tcp
        log global
        option tcplog
        bind *:443
        tcp-request inspect-delay 5s
        tcp-request content reject unless { req.ssl_hello_type 1 } { req.ssl_ver 3.2: }
        use_backend https-ok if { req_ssl_sni -m str nextcloud.fqdn.goes.here }

backend http-ok
        # and this IP address is where connections are proxied to
        server nextcloud 172.16.10.1:80 maxconn 32

backend https-ok
        mode tcp
        server nextcloud-s 172.16.10.1:443 maxconn 32

Before we start HAProxy, we’ll need to configure syslogd to create a socket within its chroot. First, use your favorite editor to add local0.info /var/log/haproxy to /etc/syslogd.conf. Then:

touch /var/log/haproxy
echo 'syslogd_flags="-a /var/haproxy/log"' >> /etc/rc.conf.local
rcctl restart syslogd

Or if you’re using doas:

doas touch /var/log/haproxy
echo 'syslogd_flags="-a /var/haproxy/log"' | doas tee -a /etc/rc.conf.local
doas rcctl restart syslogd

Uncomment the pass rule for this traffic in pf.conf, then reload the rules and start HAProxy.

pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf
rcctl enable haproxy
rcctl start haproxy

Conclusion

800ish lines of blog later, we have a working IPsec tunnel and OSPF daemons on either side passing routes around. We also have a proxy forwarding HTTP(S) connections to an internal host, and the configuration can easily be expanded to accommodate more.

Part 2 of this series will feature extending the VPN to an additional droplet, which will host some jails on FreeBSD.


  1. Rekhter, Moskowitz, Karrenberg, de Groot & Lear, “Address Allocation for Private Internets” (1996).

  2. Lee, Ninefox Gambit, Solaris (2016).
  3. That being the one where bots try default passwords, and failing that attempt to exhaust the password space. While the bots won’t be able to successfully guess a password when passwords aren’t accepted, they’ll still clutter the logs; so a blacklisting system such as sshguard is still useful.

  4. Committee on National Security Systems, “Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary” (2005).